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Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a secure key generation method between two distant parties
by wisely exploiting properties of quantum mechanics. In QKD, experimental measurement out-
comes on quantum states are transformed by the two parties to a secret key. This transformation
is composed of many logical steps (as guided by security proofs), which together will ultimately
determine the length of the final secret key and its security. We detail the procedure for performing
such classical post-processing taking into account practical concerns (including the finite-size effect
and authentication and encryption for classical communications). This procedure is directly appli-
cable to realistic QKD experiments, and thus serves as a recipe that specifies what post-processing
operations are needed and what the security level is for certain lengths of the keys. Our result is
applicable to the BB84 protocol with a single or entangled photon source.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
In theory, a few quantum key distribution (QKD) pro-
tocols, such as BB84 [1], BBM92 [2], B92 [3] and six-
state [4, 5], have been proven to be unconditionally se-
cure in the last decade [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12]. Se-
curity of other protocols, such as the Ekert91 proto-
col [13] and the device-independent QKD protocol [14],
have also been studied. For a review of QKD, one can
refer to [15, 16, 17].
QKD schemes can be classified into two types: prepare-
and-measure scheme and entanglement-based scheme. In
the former, one party, Alice, prepares the quantum sig-
nals (say, using a laser source) according to her basis and
bit values and sends them through a quantum channel to
the other party, Bob, who measures them upon reception.
In the latter type, an entanglement source emits pairs
of entangled signals, which are then measured in certain
bases chosen by Alice and Bob separately. There is an im-
portant difference in terms of security between the emit-
ted signals with practical sources in the two cases. In
the prepare-and-measure case, the signals emitted by Al-
ice (say, a weak coherent-state source) is basis-dependent,
meaning that the coherent-state signal corresponding to
one basis is quantum mechanically different from that
of the other basis. An eavesdropper, Eve, can certainly
leverage this information to her advantage. New tech-
niques such as the decoy-state method [18, 19, 20, 21, 22,
23, 24, 25], strong-reference-pulse QKD [26, 27, 28, 29],
and DPS [30, 31, 32, 33] have recently been invented
to allow the use of coherent-state sources securely. On
the other hand, entanglement-based QKD involves sig-
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nals that are basis-independent. The security of basis-
independent QKD (including entanglement-based QKD
with a PDC source and prepare-and-measure QKD with
a single-photon source) has been proven in Ref. [34]
and the performance of entanglement-based QKD with
a PDC source has been analyzed recently [35].
As security analysis of QKD has become mature, it
now comes to the stage to consider all the underlying as-
sumptions and to apply the theoretical results to practi-
cal QKD experiments. Although standard security proofs
(such as Ref. [9]) imply a procedure for distilling a final
secret key from measurement outcomes, such a procedure
cannot be directly carried out in an actual QKD exper-
iment because many of the security proofs focus on the
case that the key is arbitrarily long. Although, in the-
ory, there is not a fundamental limit on the length, it
is constrained by the computational power in practice.
Therefore, it is imperative to quantify the finite-size ef-
fect and to provide a precise post-processing recipe that
one can follow for distilling final secret keys with quan-
tified security in real QKD experiments. This is the mo-
tivation of this paper. We remark that it is not that
the security proofs are incorrect, but carrying them out
in practice requires more additional consideration on the
relation between the actual steps taken and the final se-
curity parameter.
Ultimately, QKD system designers would like to know
the classical computation and communications needed to
transform the measurement results of a QKD experiment
to a final key. Furthermore, it is important to know the
trade-off between the final key length and the security
parameter, since this allows one to estimate the number
of initial quantum signals to be sent in order to achieve
a certain final key length and security. We provide the
solution to this in the current paper.
It is important to note that the post-processing pro-
cedure contains many elements including authentication,
error correction and verification, phase error rate estima-
2tion, and privacy amplification. Integrating all these ele-
ments with a security proof is nontrivial and the resultant
post-processing procedure is the main contribution of our
paper. Our paper uses the latest security proof tech-
niques to perform post-processing analysis, along a simi-
lar line to an early work by Lu¨tkenhaus [36]. We empha-
size that the main focus of our work is the overall proce-
dure for post-processing, rather than analyzing a security
proof in the finite-key situation. We note that, recently,
lots of efforts have been spent on the finite-key effect in
QKD post-processing, such as Refs. [37, 38, 39, 40].
The finite-key-length analysis is important not only
from a theoretical point view, but also for experiments.
For example, the efficient BB84 [41] is proposed to in-
crease the key generation rate. In order to select an opti-
mal bias between the two bases, X and Z, Alice and Bob
need to consider statistical fluctuations. We will address
this issue in this paper. We remark that the proposed
post-processing scheme ties up a few existing results with
some modifications. Key features of our work are as fol-
lows:
1. a strict bound for the phase error estimation is de-
rived;
2. an authentication scheme is applied for the error
verification;
3. the efficiency of the privacy amplification is inves-
tigated;
4. parameter optimization is studied.
This paper is an expansion of our shorter paper [42] which
summarizes the essential components of our data post-
processing procedure. All the technical details related to
the procedure are presented here.
The paper is organized as follows. Sec. II introduces
the assumptions used in the paper. Sec. III discusses
the security aspect of our procedure. Sec. IV outlines
the post-processing procedures. Sec. V introduces some
preliminary tools to be used in later sections. Secs. VI-X
discuss the details of the various post-processing steps.
In Sec. XI, we investigate the parameter optimization
problem for this post-processing procedure. In Sec. XII,
we simulate an experiment setup as an example. We
conclude in Sec. XIII.
II. ASSUMPTIONS
Here, we examine the underlying assumptions used in
the post-processing scheme we propose in this paper. We
emphasize that in order to apply the scheme to a QKD
system, one needs to compare these assumptions with the
real setup. The assumptions used in the paper are listed
as follows:
1. Alice and Bob perform the BB84 protocol with a
perfect single photon source (or basis-independent
photon source [35]);
2. The detection system is compatible with the
squashing model [43, 44] (see also Ref. [45]). For
example, the efficiency mismatch is not considered
in this paper;
3. Alice and Bob use perfect random number gener-
ators and perfect key management. They share a
certain amount of secure key prior to running their
QKD system.
III. SECURITY ASPECT
Our data post-processing procedure is derived from
entanglement distillation protocol (EDP)-based security
proofs [8, 9, 46] (also see [47]) and thus our procedure
is secure against the most general attacks allowed by
the laws of quantum mechanics. The original idea [8]
casts QKD as distilling Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR)
pairs between Alice and Bob, involving correcting general
quantum errors. And the ability to correct general quan-
tum errors is equivalent to the ability to correct bit and
phase errors [48, 49]. Later, Shor and Preskill [9] show
that correcting bit errors and phase errors in the EDP
picture correspond to bit error correction and privacy
amplification in distilling a secret key. Thus, proving
the security of QKD can be cast as showing that both
bit and phase errors are corrected in the EDP picture.
In this way, provided that a quantum error correction
code exists for the specific bit and phase error rates in
the EDP picture, the security of the corresponding QKD
protocol is proved. However, this places a rather strong
requirement on the quantum error correction code since
constraints on both bit and phase error rates have to be
satisfied. Fortunately, Lo [46] further shows that bit and
phase errors can be decoupled by simply encrypting the
bit error syndrome transmission (without affecting the
net key generation rate). Koashi [47] adopts the same
decoupling mechanism and further generalizes the notion
of phase errors with a simple and yet powerful argument.
In this paper, we follow this line of security proofs in our
finite-key analysis. Essentially, the important ingredients
in our analysis are
• encrypting the bit error syndromes;
• using a random sampling argument to place bounds
on the phase error rate;
• using a privacy amplification scheme (with struc-
ture) and placing bounds on its phase error cor-
recting capacity;
• integrating authentication in classical communica-
tions.
A. Composable security
The finite key analysis is closely related to the def-
inition of security. Currently, the composable security
3definition of QKD [50, 51] is widely accepted as the most
stringent security definition in the field. QKD is com-
posable in the sense that the final key generated is indis-
tinguishable from an ideal secret key except with a small
probability, and thus the key can be used in a subse-
quent cryptographic task where an ideal key is expected.
A secret key is considered ideal if it is identical between
Alice and Bob and is private to Eve (i.e., Eve has no in-
formation on it). The notion of composability was first
proposed in the classical setting for the study of secu-
rity when composing classical cryptographic protocols in
a complex manner [52, 53]. Composability has also been
carried over to the quantum setting [50, 54]. One essen-
tial feature of the composable security definition is that it
characterizes the security of a protocol with respect to the
ideal functionality. In particular, the security of a com-
posable secret key generated by QKD is measured with
the trace distance between the real situation with the real
key and the ideal situation with an ideal key [12, 51, 55].
Definition 1 ([12, 51, 55]). A random variable V (the
classical key) drawn from the set V is said to be ζ-secure
with respect to an eavesdropper holding a quantum sys-
tem E if
1
2
Tr |ρV E − ρU ⊗ ρE | ≤ ζ (1)
where ρV E =
∑
v∈V PV (v)|v〉〈v| ⊗ ρE|V=v, ρU =∑
v∈V |v〉〈v|/|V| represents an ideal key taking values uni-
formly over V , and |V| is the size of V . Here, Tr |A| =∑
i |λi| where λi are the eigenvalues of A.
Since the trace distance 12 Tr |ρ − σ| is the maximum
probability of distinguishing between the two quantum
states ρ and σ, this security definition naturally gives
rise to the operational meaning that the ζ-secure key
V is identical to an ideal key U except with proba-
bility ζ. This trace-distance security parameter is ad-
ditive when practical cryptographic protocols are com-
posed [50]. That is to say, suppose we have a key gener-
ation protocol (e.g., QKD) and a second cryptographic
protocol which consumes an ideal secret key. Further-
more, we suppose that the first protocol realizes an ideal
key generation scheme with a security parameter ζ1 for a
particular secret key output, and also the second protocol
realizes its ideal functionality with a security parameter
ζ2. Then, when the two protocols are composed (i.e., the
imperfect key generated in the first protocol is used in
the second protocol), the overall security parameter will
become ζ1 + ζ2.
Our paper is based on EDP-based proofs which often
justify security with the fidelity between Alice and Bob’s
state and the ideal state (the perfect EPR pairs). This
fidelity is a direct consequence of the failure probability
of the post-processing procedure. Thus, we need to find
a connection of this failure probability with the compos-
ability definition in Definition 1.
The generation of the final key in one round of QKD
is composed of many steps (cf. Sec. IV and Table I)
and each step carries a certain failure probability. This
probability represents the case that Alice and Bob believe
the step has succeeded but actually not (in other word, a
case of undetected failure). A detected failure in any step
will lead a premature termination of the QKD process.
Successes of all steps will result in a perfect final key that
is private to Eve and identical between Alice and Bob.
However, since each step may fail without being detected,
there is a certain probability that the final key fails to be
perfect and this probability is upper bounded by the sum
of the failure probabilities of all the steps. Essentially,
this sum is the failure probability ε of the entire post-
processing procedure, which needs to be converted to the
security parameter of the final key.
In the context of Koashi’s proof [47], success of the
phase error correcting step as part of the post-processing
procedure guarantees that Alice’s m-qubit state ρA can
be corrected to the pure state 0⊗mX . The final key is
then generated by m measurements in the Z-basis on
ρA. Since the entire post-processing procedure fails with
probability at most ε, the component of Alice’s state
ρA corresponding to the pure state 0
⊗m
X must satisfy
〈0⊗mX |ρA|0⊗mX 〉 ≥ 1 − ε. In order to make the connec-
tion with the universal composability definition in Defi-
nition 1, it has been suggested [55] (also see [50]) that a
bound on the trace distance is obtained from the fidelity
using a general inequality relating them [56]:
1
2
Tr |ρ− σ| ≤
√
1− F (ρ, σ)2, (2)
where F (ρ, σ) = Tr
√
ρ1/2σρ1/2 is the fidelity between
ρ and σ. Thus, we seek the minimum of the fi-
delity between ρAE and
∣∣0⊗mX 〉A
〈
0⊗mX
∣∣ ⊗ ρE in order to
get an upper bound on their trace distance, in accor-
dance with Definition 1. Since the fidelity never de-
creases under a trace-preserving quantum operation (i.e.,
F (E(ρ), E(σ)) ≥ F (ρ, σ)), system E can be considered to
be the entire purification of system A when the minimum
occurs. Assuming this worst case, the joint state is of the
form
|ΨAE〉 =
√
α
∣∣0⊗mX 〉A|0〉E +
√
1− α
∣∣Ψ⊥〉
AE
(3)
where
∣∣Ψ⊥〉
AE
has unit norm, A〈0⊗mX
∣∣Ψ⊥〉
AE
= 0, and
α ≥ 1 − ε. The fidelity between the real situation and
the ideal situation is (see Appendix A for proof)
F
(
ρAE ,
∣∣0⊗mX 〉A〈0⊗mX
∣∣⊗ ρE) ≥ α (4)
≥ 1− ε (5)
where ρAE = |ΨAE〉〈ΨAE| and ρE = TrA(ρAE). Thus,
an upper bound on the failure probability provided by
the EDP-based proofs can easily be translated to a com-
posable security measure. By substituting Eq. (5) for the
fidelity in Eq. (2) and using the fact that projection onto
the eigenstates of the Z-basis corresponding to the final
measurement does not increase the trace distance [79],
we conclude that the final key is
√
ε(2− ε)-secure in ac-
cordance with Definition 1.
4Lemma 1. When the failure probability of the post-
processing procedure is ε, the final key is
√
ε(2− ε)-
secure in accordance with Definition 1.
We can apply this lemma when many rounds of QKD
are composed. Suppose the post-processing of each round
fails with a probability ε, and Alice and Bob plan to use
a QKD system a million times in the manner that the se-
cret key output of one round is fed as input to the next.
Since the trace-distance measure is additive when cryp-
tographic protocols are composed [50], the trace-distance
security parameter for the key in the last round will
be 106
√
ε(2− ε). Note that this security parameter in-
creases linearly with the number of rounds of the QKD
system. This linear dependence is an important feature
of the composability security definition.
We note that Mayers’ security proof [6, 7] has also
implicitly mentioned using failure probability to quantify
the security.
B. Equivalence of the failure probability and the
trace distance as the optimization objective
The failure probability of the post-processing proce-
dure ε is related to the trace-distance security parameter
ζ by ζ =
√
ε(2− ε). Since dζdε > 0 and d
2ζ
dε2 < 0, we
have ζ(1) > ζ(2) ⇔ ε(1) > ε(2) and there is a one-to-one
mapping between these two measures. Thus, minimizing
either ε or ζ subject to the same constraints (such as a
fixed key length) will produce the same solution.
C. Simple lower bound on failure probability
It is easy to lower bound the failure probability as
a function of the secret-key cost kinitial by considering
that Eve has a 2−kinitial chance of guessing the right ini-
tial secret key and thus will be able to launch a man-
in-the-middle attack successfully. Therefore, the failure
probability of any post-processing scheme should be at
least 2−kinitial . Moreover, the failure probability of our
scheme exhibits the same exponential decrease as the
lower bound (see the various constituent failure proba-
bilities ε’s listed in Table I).
IV. OUTLINE OF POST-PROCESSING
PROCEDURE
The post-processing procedure is listed as follows. We
remark that each communication between Alice and Bob
consists of a message and an authentication tag, each
of which may be of zero length. In our scheme, a tag
is transmitted if and only if authentication is used and
in this case the authentication tag is always encrypted
by a one-time pad, consuming some pre-shared secret
bits. When a message is transmitted, it may or may
not be encrypted, and it is assumed to be unencrypted
unless otherwise stated. Note that no message but a
tag is transmitted in the error verification step (step 4).
Fig. 1 shows the flow chart of our data post-processing
procedure.
1. Key sift [not authenticated]: Alice sends N quan-
tum signals to Bob, of which n signals produce
clicks. Bob discards all no-click events and obtains
n-bit raw key by randomly assigning values to the
double-click events [80]. Note that other key sift
procedures might be applied as well (see, for exam-
ple, Ref. [57]).
2. Basis sift [authenticated]: Alice and Bob send each
other n-bit basis information. In the end of this
step, Alice and Bob obtain nx (nz)-bit sifted key
in the X(Z)-basis. Define the bias ratio to be qx ≡
nx/(nx + nz). Note that this bias ratio is different
from the probability the Alice and Bob choose the
two bases. Define the probability that Alice and
Bob choose the X-basis to be px, then in the long
key limit, qx = p
2
x/[p
2
x + (1 − px)2].
3. Error correction [not authenticated but encrypted,
Section VII]: Alice and Bob perform error correc-
tion so that Bob’s raw key matches Alice’s. The
classical messages exchanged in this process are en-
crypted. If error correction fails, Alice and Bob
abort the QKD process.
4. Error verification [Section VIII]: Alice and Bob
want to make sure (with a high probability) that
their keys after the error correction step are identi-
cal. If error verification fails, Alice and Bob either
go back to the error correction step or abort the
QKD process. We note that the idea of using error
verification to replace error testing is proposed by
Lu¨tkenhaus [36].
5. Phase error rate estimation [no communication,
Section IX]: Alice and Bob use the bit error rate
measured in the X(Z)-basis to infer the phase error
rate in the Z(X)-basis. The uncertainty in bound-
ing the phase error rates are quantified by a random
sampling argument.
6. Privacy amplification [authenticated, Section X]:
Alice randomly generates an (nx + nz + l − 1)-bit
random bit string and sends to Bob through an
authenticated channel. Alice and Bob use this ran-
dom bit string to generate a Toeplitz matrix. The
final key (with a size of l) will be the product of
this matrix (with a size of (nx + nz) × l) and the
key string (with a size of nx + nz).
7. The final secure key length (net growth) is given by
NR ≥ l − kbs − kec − kev − kpa (6)
5Key pool Encryption Authentication 
Yes 
Device characterization 
Quantum state transmission and 
measurement 
Key sift 
Privacy amplification 
Error verification  
No 
Error correction 
Discard no clicks 
Randomly assign 
double clicks 
Basis sift 
Abort 
Failed 
FIG. 1: Flow chart of our data post-processing procedure [58].
with a failure probability of
ε ≤ εbs + εev + εph + εpa (7)
where l is given by Eq. (32). Here, the k’s are the
secret-key costs and the ε’s are the failure proba-
bilities for steps 2-6 (see Table I). Throughout the
paper, ε’s with various footnotes stand for various
failure probabilities.
V. PRELIMINARY
A. Data representation
Data are represented as matrices or column vectors of
0’s and 1’s. Additions are carried out in modulo 2. For
example, a raw key x is multiplied by a privacy ampli-
fication matrix M to generate the final y = Mx, where
the ith bit of y is
∑
j M(i, j)x(j) mod 2.
B. Toeplitz matrices
In our framework, we rely heavily on a particular class
of hash functions to perform phase error correction, error
verification, and authentication. We are interested in
using sets of Toeplitz matrices to perform these tasks.
Toeplitz matrices are Boolean matrices with a special
structure:
M =


a0 a−1 a−2 · · · a−m+1
a1 a0 a−1
. . .
a2 a1
. . .
...
...
. . .
al−1 · · · al−m


(8)
where ai = 0, 1. It can also be concisely described by
M(i,j) = ai−j where M(i,j) is the (i, j) element of M .
The advantage of using Toeplitz matrices is that it can
be specified by a small number of parameters, namely,
m+l−1 bits, as opposed toml bits for completely random
matrices. Hashing of a given column vector x (whose
elements are 0 or 1) can be performed by choosing a
Toeplitz matrix M randomly and computing the hash
value as Mx.
In our post-processing scheme, we use Toeplitz matri-
ces for three purposes: privacy amplification, error veri-
fication, and authentication. We remark that fully ran-
dom Toeplitz matrices (specified by m + l − 1 random
bits) are used for privacy amplification, while for error
verification and authentication, Toeplitz matrices speci-
fied by a smaller number (2l) of random bits are used in
order to save secret bits (see Sec. VC below).
C. Authentication
Alice and Bob can authenticate their classical commu-
nications with a family of Toeplitz matrices. For every
(classical) message they need to authenticate, both par-
ties select a hash function from a fixed family using pre-
shared secret bits. The sending party computes the hash
value for the message (called the tag) and sends both to
the other party, who also computes the hash value for
the received message and can conclude that the message
originates from the legitimate party if both hash values
are identical.
In authentication, the key component is the construc-
tion of hashing function. Wegman and Carter proposed
unconditional secure authentication schemes [59, 60]
by introducing the universal hashing function families,
which are also used for privacy amplification. After-
wards, lots of efforts have been spent on how to construct
a universal hashing function family effectively. In this pa-
per, we use the LFSR-based Toeplitz matrix construction
by Krawczyk [61, 62] for authentication.
Here we state the result of the LFSR-based Toeplitz
matrix construction, which is given by Theorem 9 of
Ref. [61] by Krawczyk. The authentication scheme based
on the LFSR-based Toeplitz matrix construction is se-
cure with a failure probability of
εau = n2
−k+1 (9)
6Step message length message encrypted? tag length failure probability
1. Key sift N - - -
2. Basis sift 2n No 2kbs 2εbs [Eq. (11)]
3. Bit error correction kec [Eq. (12)] Yes - -
4. Error verification - - kev εev [Eq. (14)]
5. Phase error estimation - - - εph [Eq. (21)]
6. Privacy amplification (nx + nz + l − 1) No kpa εpa [Eq. (31)]
TABLE I: List of resource cost and the failure probabilities in the various steps. Lengths of pre-shared secret key bits are
designated with k while the failure probabilities with ε. The relevant equations involving these quantities are also shown.
where k is the length of the tag, n is the length of the
message. The authentication scheme can be stated as fol-
lows. Alice and Bob use a 2k-bit secure key to construct
a Toeplitz matrix with a size of (k × n) by a LFSR. The
authenticated tag is generated by multiplying the matrix
and the message. Then they encrypt the tag by another
k-bit secure key. Since the tag is encrypted by a one-time
pad, the 2k-bit key used for the Toeplitz matrix construc-
tion is still secure [61]. Hence, the net secure-key cost for
this scheme is k.
We remark that in Krawczyk’s later result [62], the
secure key required for the LFSR-based Toeplitz matrix
construction can be reduced to an arbitrary number r,
with sacrifice of failure probability,
εau =
1
2k
+
k + n− 1
2r/2
. (10)
One can see that by choosing r = 2k, Eq. (9) gives a
slightly tighter bound than Eq. (10) for the failure prob-
ability. Since the secure-key cost is at least k in this con-
struction due to one-time pad encryption, for simplicity,
we use Eq. (9) for authentication and error verification.
We remark that, as pointed out in Ref. [61], the LFSR-
based Toeplitz matrix construction is highly practical in
real-life implementation.
VI. BASIS SIFT
Alice and Bob send each other n-bit basis information.
Due to the symmetry, we can assume the same failure
probability for the two message exchanges [61]:
εbs = n2
−kbs+1 . (11)
Here, Alice and Bob use a 2kbs-bit secure key to construct
a Toeplitz matrix with a size of (kbs×n) by a LFSR. The
authenticated tag is generated by multiplying the matrix
and the message. Then they encrypt the two tags by
two kbs-bit secure keys. The total secure-key cost in this
step is 2kbs (for the one-time-pad encryption of the tags)
and the corresponding failure probability is 2εbs. Note
that when Alice and Bob use a biased basis choice [41],
they can exchange less than n-bit classical information
for basis sift by data compression. Since the secure-key
cost only logarithmically depends on the length of the
message, we simply use n for the following discussion. In
the end of this step, Alice and Bob obtain nx (nz)-bit
sifted key in the X (Z) basis. Define the bias ratio to be
qx ≡ nx/(nx + nz) as in Sec. IV.
VII. ERROR CORRECTION
For simplicity of discussion, we assume that Bob tries
to correct his raw key to match Alice’s. This means that
we assume no advantage distillation [63, 64]. Error cor-
rection is done by Alice sending parity information of her
raw key to Bob encrypted with secret bits from the key
pool. The secure-key cost is given by
kec = nxf(ebx)H(ebx) + nzf(ebz)H(ebz) (12)
where f(x) is the error correction efficiency, and
H(x) = −x log2(x)− (1− x) log2(1 − x) (13)
is the binary entropy function. In practice, Alice and
Bob only need to count the amount of classical commu-
nication used in the error correction. That is, the value
of kec can be directly obtained from the post-processing.
After the error correction, Alice and Bob count the num-
ber of errors in the X (Z) basis: ebxnx (ebznz). Note
that although we assume encryption of the parity infor-
mation here (cf. Sec. III), it may be avoided by basing
the post-processing on other security proofs. In this case,
there may be some restriction on the error correction pro-
cedure and more privacy amplification may be required.
In practice, there is an advantage to using error correc-
tion without encryption, since if Alice and Bob abort the
QKD procedure, no secret bits will be lost due to encryp-
tion.
There is no failure probability associated with error
correction in our post-processing scheme. Identity be-
tween Alice’s and Bob’s sifted keys is verified with an
error verification step (Sec. VIII below).
VIII. ERROR VERIFICATION
Suppose Alice and Bob each holds a bit string a and
b. They can verify the identity of their strings by ex-
changing shorter strings which are the hash values f(a)
7and f(b). Identity of the two hash values provides confi-
dence that the two strings are the same. Below we argue
that error verification is the same as authentication, and
thus we use the same procedure for both purposes. This
procedure and the associated properties is described in
the authentication section (Sec. VC).
A. Relation to authentication
In QKD post-processing, authenticated classical com-
munication is required to overcome the man-in-the-
middle attack. The objective of the authentication pro-
cedure can be stated as follows. Alice sends Bob a mes-
sage through a (classical) channel, which is accessible to
Eve. Alice uses some authentication scheme to make sure
(with a high probability) that the message is not mod-
ified during the transmission. This classical problem is
well studied in the literature [59, 60, 61, 62]. One tra-
ditional solution is for Alice to add a redundant code
(tag) to the message to be sent. The tag-message pair
is designed in such a way that whenever the message is
modified, Bob can detect it (with a high probability).
Error verification, on the other hand, is the procedure
for ensuring (with a high probability) that the bit strings
(or keys) owned by Alice and Bob are identical. One nat-
ural way to do this is by random hashing. For example,
Alice randomly hashes her bit string and sends the hash
value to Bob. Bob uses the same hash function to obtain
his hash value and compares to the one sent by Alice.
The probability that Alice and Bob possess different bit
strings (keys) decrease exponentially with the number of
rounds of hashing.
By comparing the two procedures, authentication and
error verification, one can see their commonality. In order
to show the link between the two procedures, we break
down the authentication procedure into two parts: Alice
sends Bob the message first and then the tag. Let us take
a look at the stage where Bob just receives the message
sent by Alice (but before the tag). Now, Alice and Bob
each has a bit string. In authentication, Alice sends a tag
(corresponding to her message) to Bob and Bob verifies
it. The claim of a secure authentication scheme is that if
the tag passes Bob’s test, the probability that Alice and
Bob share the same string is high. This is exactly what
is asked in the error verification procedure. Therefore,
secure authentication schemes can be used for the error
verification.
We remark that the only difference between the two
procedures is that authentication does not care whether
the tag reveals information about the message or not,
but error verification does (at least for our use in QKD
post-processing). This difference can be easily overcome
by encrypting the tag, which has already been done in
some authentication schemes including the one we use in
this paper.
Thus, in this procedure, Alice sends an encrypted tag
of an authentication scheme to Bob. The failure proba-
bility for this step, kev, similar to Eq. (11), is
εev = (nx + nz)2
−kev+1. (14)
IX. PHASE ERROR RATE ESTIMATION
In the BB84 protocol, Alice and Bob measure the bit
error rate in the X-basis, ebx, to estimate the phase error
rate in the Z-basis, epz, and vice versa. In the infinite
length limit, the error rates, ebx and epz, converge to the
underlying probabilities, pbx and ppz . Due to the sym-
metry of BB84, we know that pbx = ppz , from which
follows ebx = epz in the asymptotic case. With a finite
key size, the rate is fluctuating around the corresponding
probability. Now the question can be stated as a ran-
dom sampling problem: given the bit error rate in the
X-basis (ebx), the sample size (nx), and the population
size (nx + nz), upper bound the phase error rate in the
Z-basis (epz), with a probability 1− Pθx,
Pθx ≡ Pr{epz ≥ ebx + θx}, (15)
where θx represents the deviation of the phase error rate
from the tested value (the bit error rate in another basis)
due to the finite-size effect. Here nx and nz are the num-
ber of sifted key bits in the X- and Z-basis, respectively.
The failure probability Pθx will be related to the failure
probability of the phase error rate estimation step (see
Eq. (21)).
A. Random sampling
Define two random variables: k ≡ ebxnx and m ≡
epznz+ebxnx. The number of bit errors in theX-basis, k,
can be accurately (with a high probability) counted after
the error verification procedure. Note thatm denotes the
number of bit errors if Bob measures all nx + nz qubits
in the X-basis. In the squashing model [43, 44, 65], Eve
prepares the qubit received by Bob. Hence, one can as-
sume Eve chooses a distribution of m, Pr{m}, before
Bob’s detection.
In order to link the probability, Pθx, to the measure-
ment results, nx, nz and k (or ebx), we go back to the
original definition of the security parameter in QKD. In
the security analysis of QKD, Pθx denotes the probabil-
ity that Eve sets up a distribution Pr{m} (by preparing
qubits) and then Bob obtains k bit errors in the X-basis.
Therefore, the mathematical definition for Pθx is
Pθx = Pr{epz ≥ ebx + θx, ebx}
= Pr{m ≥ ebx(nx + nz) + θxnz, k}
=
ebxnx+nz∑
m=ebx(nx+nz)+θxnz
Pr{m, k}
=
ebxnx+nz∑
m=ebx(nx+nz)+θxnz
Pr{k|m}Pr{m}.
(16)
8Bob chooses to measure the X-basis randomly (without
replacement, of course), and thus Pr{k|m} is given by a
hypergeometric function,
Pr{k|m} =
(
m
k
)(
nx+nz−m
nx−k
)
(
nx+nz
nx
) . (17)
It is not hard to prove that Eq. (17) is a strict decreas-
ing function of m when m > (nx + nz)ebx. Thus, from
Eq. (16),
Pθx ≤ Pr{k|m = ebx(nx + nz) + θxnz}
<
√
nx + nz√
ebx(1− ebx)nxnz
2−(nx+nz)ξx(θx)
(18)
where the first equality holds when Eve sets the prob-
ability distribution to be a delta function Pr{m} =
δm,ebx(nx+nz)+θxnz . The derivation of the second inequal-
ity is presented in Appendix B. Note that all the vari-
ables in Eq. (18) can be measured in practice. The func-
tion ξx(θ) is given by
ξx(θx) ≡H(ebx + θx − qxθx)− qxH(ebx)
− (1 − qx)H(ebx + θx) (19)
where qx = nx/(nx + nz) is the bias ratio.
A similar formula for the failure probability of phase
error rate estimation in the X-basis, Pθz, can also be
derived,
Pθz <
√
nx + nz√
ebz(1 − ebz)nxnz
2−(nx+nz)ξz(θz), (20)
with ξz(θz) is defined by ξz(θz) ≡ H(ebz + θz − qzθz) −
qzH(ebz) − (1 − qz)H(ebz + θz) and qz = nz/(nx + nz).
Combining the failure probabilities for the X-basis and
Z-basis, the total failure probability of phase error rate
estimation, εph, is then given by
εph ≤ Pθx + Pθz . (21)
In case ebx = 0 (or ebz = 0), one can replace it by
nxebx = 1 (or nzebz = 1) to get around the singularity as
shown in Appendix B. One can see that ξx(θx) is positive
when θx > 0 and 0 ≤ ebx, ebx + θx ≤ 1, due to concavity
of the binary entropy function H(x).
B. Large data size approximation
In the limit of large nx and nz, θx can be chosen to be
small. Then we can use Taylor expansion for Eq. (19),
ξx(θx) =H(ebx + θx − qxθx)− qxH(ebx)
− (1 − qx)H(ebx + θ)
=− 1
2
(1− qx)qxH ′′(ebx)θ2x +O(θ3x)
=
ln 2
2
(1− qx)qx
(1 − ebx)ebx θ
2
x +O(θ
3
x).
(22)
When qx = 1/2, i.e., nx = nz, and θx is small, the failure
probability is given by
Pθx <
1
2
√
2nebx(1− ebx)
e
−
θ2xn
4(1−ebx)ebx . (23)
Except for the factor 1/
[
2
√
2nebx(1− ebx)
]
, this is what
is used in the literature, such as Refs. [9, 35]. In practice,
normally we have 2
√
2nebx(1− ebx) > 1, so the bound
given by Eq. (23) is tighter than what is used in the
literature.
X. PRIVACY AMPLIFICATION
In view of the EDP picture, we regard privacy am-
plification as the result of phase error correction. In
the following, we focus on using two-universal hashing
to perform phase error correction and determine the cor-
responding failure probability.
A. Two-universal hashing
The family of all Toeplitz matrices {M} of size l ×m
has 2l+m−1 elements and satisfies the following property:
Pr{Mx =My} = 1
2l
for all x 6= y, (24)
where it is assumed that each matrix is chosen with equal
probability. This can be proved by slightly adapting the
proof of Claim 7 of Ref. [66]. Note that the family of
hash functions performed with Toeplitz matrices is one
specific case of a more general class known as the two-
universal families of hash functions. A family of hash
functions mapping S to T is called two-universal [59] if
Pr{f(x) = f(y)} ≤ 1|T | for all x 6= y, (25)
where f(x) is a hash function chosen in the family of hash
functions and in our case f(x) = Mx. Two-universal
families of hash functions have many useful properties
and we will rely on some of the them in this paper.
B. Error correction
Suppose Alice holds a bit string, a, and Bob a noisy
version of it, b. The difference between the two strings
e = a ⊕ b is the error pattern. Let S be the set of all
possible error patterns. Alice and Bob intend to use a
family of two-universal linear hash functions to correct
errors in Bob’s string with respect to Alice’s. A hash
function f(·) is selected from the family and Alice and
Bob each computes the hash value of their bit strings with
the hash function. Alice sends Bob her hash value, to
9which Bob adds his hash value to arrive at the hash value
of the error pattern f(e) = f(a)⊕f(b). Note that this is
valid due to the linearity of the hash functions. Using this
hash value, Bob can identify the error pattern and thus
correct the errors in his string. Suppose that there are |T |
possible outputs for this family of hash functions. Using
the definition of a two-universal family given in Eq. (25),
we can bound the probability of incorrectly identifying
the error pattern as
Pr


⋃
e
′∈S\e
f(e) = f(e′)

 ≤
|S|
|T | (26)
which follows from applying the union bound to Eq. (25).
Thus, Bob’s error-corrected string matches Alice’s with
probability at least 1− |S|/|T |.
Although this hashing-based error correcting proce-
dure may not be as practical and efficient as conventional
ones, it is useful for phase error correction in security
proofs [9, 46, 47]. This is because for security purpose
we only need to show that the phase error pattern is
identified without actually correcting the error [9], and
we only need a bound on the probability of successfully
identifying the error pattern.
C. Privacy amplification and phase error correction
Suppose we perform privacy amplification using a set
of l × m Toeplitz matrices, a member of which can be
selected with l+m−1 random bits. Here, l is the final key
length and m is the sifted key length. For each matrixM
in the privacy amplification set, we associate an (m− l)×
m matrixM⊥ that is orthogonal to M . The collection of
all these matrices {M⊥} forms the set of hash functions
for phase error correction. We would like to find out
whether this set {M⊥} has the property of Eq. (25). If
it does, we can determine the successful probability of
phase error correction from Eq. (26).
We remark that it does not matter whether the matri-
ces of the set {M⊥} have the Toeplitz form or not since
we do not need to generate them but only need to make
sure that there exists such a set with a certain phase error
correcting capability. On the other hand, we do impose
the Toeplitz form on the privacy amplification set {M}
since we actually need to generate this set.
Indeed, it can be shown (see, e.g., Theorem 1 of
Ref. [67]) that when M is chosen from a set of random
Toeplitz matrices, the corresponding matrices M⊥ also
form a two-universal set, i.e.,
Pr{M⊥x =M⊥y} ≤ 1
2m−l
for all x 6= y.
Thus, according to the discussion in Sec. XB, we can
use the set {M⊥} to identify the phase error pattern
and perform the correction. In essence, when (i) there
are |S| number of possible phase error patterns, (ii) the
sifted key length is m, and (iii) the final key length is l,
the failure probability of phase error correction is upper
bounded by
εpc = |S|2−(m−l). (27)
(Note that the sifted key length here will be equal to
m = nx + nz when it is used in the next subsection.)
For BB84, the bit error rates for the Z bits and X bits
are exactly determined from the error correction proce-
dures, up to a certain probability given by the verification
step (cf. Eq. (14)). Focusing on the Z bits, we can esti-
mate its phase error rate epz from the actual bit error rate
of the X bits ebx using the random sampling argument
of Sec. IX. Accordingly, the lower and upper bounds on
the number of phase errors on the Z bits are, except with
probability Pθx (which is bounded in Eq. (18)),
0 ≤ epznz < (ebx + θx)nz . (28)
(Note that the second inequality is a strictly less than
due to the definition of Pθx in Eq. (15).) Therefore, with
probability at least 1−Pθx , the number of possible phase
error patterns in the Z bits is
|Sz| =
⌈(ebx+θx)nz−1⌉∑
k=0
(
nz
k
)
<
(
nz
(ebx + θx)nz
)
(29)
< 2nzH(ebx+θx), (30)
where the first inequality holds for ebx + θx < 1/3 (see
Appendix C for proof of the first inequality and see, e.g.,
Refs. [68, 69] for proof of the second inequality). We can
similarly obtain the bound for the number of possible
phase error patterns in the X bits |Sx|. Combining the
number of patterns in the Z and X bits, we have |S| =
|Sz||Sx| in Eq. (27).
D. Key length
Alice and Bob determine the size of the matrix, l ×
(nx+nz), used for hashing. Here, l is the key length after
the privacy amplification. Alice generates an (nx + nz +
l− 1)-bit random bit string and sends it to Bob through
an authenticated channel. Alice and Bob use this random
bit string to generate a Toeplitz matrix. The final key
(with a size of l) will be the product of this matrix (with
a size of l× (nx + nz)) and the key string (with a size of
nx+nz) after passing through the error verification. The
overall failure probability of the privacy amplification is
the sum of that for authentication (Eq. (9)) and that for
phase error correction (Eq. (27)):
εpa = (nx + nz + l − 1)2−kpa+1 + 2−toe (31)
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where kpa is the secure-key cost for the authentication
and toe is related to Eq. (27) by 2
−toe = εpc. By rear-
ranging Eqs. (27) and (30), the final key length is
l = nx[1−H(ebz + θz)]
+ nz[1−H(ebx + θx)]− toe.
(32)
The first term in Eq. (31) gives the failure probability of
the authentication for the (nx + nz + l − 1)-bit random
bit string transmission. The second term in Eq. (31)
gives the failure probability of privacy amplification using
the Toeplitz matrix. In the equivalent EDP used in the
security proof [9, 47], the second term in Eq. (31) gives
the failure probability of the phase error correction.
XI. OPTIMIZATION
Alice and Bob calibrate the QKD system to get an
estimate of the transmittance η, the error rates ebx and
ebz. Through some rough calculation of the target length
of the final key, they decide the acceptable confidence
interval 1 − ε and fix the length of the experiment, N ,
which denotes the number pulses sent by Alice. Then
roughly, the length of the raw key is n = Nη. After basis
sift, Alice and Bob share an nx-bit (nz-bit) key in the X
(Z)-basis.
Alice and Bob can optimize their post-processing using
either the failure probability or the trace distance as the
security measure, since they are directly related to one
another as discussed in Sec. III B. Here, we will use the
failure probability as the security measure for our dis-
cussion. The failure probability ε is chosen by Alice and
Bob according to the later practical use of the final key.
The desired message security level sets an upper bound
threshold value for ε. Thus, the exact value of ε is not
strictly pre-determined. That is, it can slightly deviate
from the pre-determined threshold value.
Given n and ε (cf. Eq. (7)), Alice and Bob need to
optimize all the parameters for the key generation rate
given in Eq. (6). The first parameter they want to op-
timize is the basis bias ratio, qx = nx/(nx + nz) which
(roughly) determines the probabilities to choose the X
and Z bases, px and pz, by qx ≈ p2x/(p2x + p2z). The bias
ratio should be determined before quantum transmission
while all other parameters can be determined right after a
raw key is obtained. The initial calibration process gives
Alice and Bob some idea about the basis ratio which they
will use in the subsequent QKD process. The remaining
parameters that need to be optimized are as follows: kbs,
kec, kev, kpa, εbs, εev, εph, εpa and toe. Alice and Bob
need to balance the failure probabilities from each step
(cf. Eq. (7)) and the secure-key cost (cf. Eq. (6)). The
optimization problem becomes the following: given the
total failure probability
ε ≤2εbs + εev + εph + εpa
=2n2−kbs+1 + (nx + nz)2
−kev+1 + εph
+ (nx + nz + l − 1)2−kpa+1 + 2−toe ,
(33)
maximize the final key length
NR ≥ l − 2kbs − kec − kev − kpa. (34)
Note that the parameters kbs, kev , kpa and toe affect ε
and the final key rate in similar ways. Also, error correc-
tion and phase error rate estimation mainly depend on
the bias ratio. Thus, Alice and Bob can group the secure
key costs and failure probabilities into two parts by defin-
ing ε3 ≡ 2εbs + εev + εpa and k3 ≡ 2kbs + kev + kpa + toe
(see Eqs. (32), (6), and (7)). The final secure key length
can be rewritten as
NR ≥ nx[1− f(ebx)H(ebx)−H(ebz + θz)]
+ nz[1− f(ebz)H(ebz)−H(ebx + θx)]− k3.
(35)
We remark that if the contribution from one basis is neg-
ative in Eq. (35), Alice and Bob should use the detections
from this basis for parameter estimation only, but not for
the key.
We consider the subproblem: given the failure proba-
bility
ε3 ≤2εbs + εev + εpa
=2n2−kbs+1 + (nx + nz)2
−kev+1
+ (nx + nz + l − 1)2−kpa+1 + 2−toe ,
(36)
minimize the secret-key cost
k3 ≥ 2kbs + kev + kpa. (37)
With the inequality of arithmetic and geometric means,
one can show that the optimized secure-key cost for each
step is given by
toe =
k3
5
− 4
5
− 1
5
log2A
kbs = toe + 1 + log2 n
kev = toe + 1 + log2(nx + nz)
kpa = toe + 1 + log2(nx + nz + l − 1),
(38)
whereA = n2(nx+nz)(nx+nz+l−1). The corresponding
failure probability is
ε3 = 5A
1/52−(k3−4)/5. (39)
From Eq. (39), we have
k3 = −5 log2 ε3 + log2A+ 4 + 5 log2 5. (40)
Note that n4/4 < A < 2n4 and also ε = ε3+ εph. Here if
Alice and Bob allow ε to have a small deviation from the
pre-determined value, they can put a soft lower bound
for ε3 in the optimization. The exact value of the soft
lower bound is not really important here as long as it
is within the tolerable fluctuation range of ε. Here, we
simply choose the tolerable deviation to be within 1%,
which implies that 10−2ε < ε3 < ε. Thus,
−5 log2 ε+4 log2 n+ 2 + 5 log2 5 < k3
< −5 log2 ε+ 4 log2 n+ 15 + 15 log2 5.
(41)
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This is true for all θx, θz and qx. Note that the difference
between the lower bound and the soft upper bound of k3
is less than 37 bits. When the final key length is much
larger than 37 bits, Alice and Bob can set
k3 = −5 log2 ε+ 4 log2 n+ 50 (42)
and the failure probability ε3 will satisfy ε3 < 10
−2ε since
the right-hand side of Eq. (42) is larger than the upper
bound in Eq. (41).
Since Alice and Bob will recalculate the failure prob-
ability in the end and allow the final ε to have a small
deviation from the predefined value, they can safely use
εph = ε in the optimization of the basis bias. Thus, the
simplified optimization problem only has three parame-
ters to be optimized: qx, θx and θz, given εph = ε−ε3 ≈ ε.
In summary, the simplified optimization procedure for
a target failure probability ε is as follows:
1. Compute k3 using Eq. (42);
2. Maximize the key rate in Eq. (35) over qx, θx, and
θz subject to εph = ε. Here, εph is related to the
three optimization variables by Eqs. (18), (20), and
(21);
3. After the optimization, they can recalculate the fi-
nal failure probability ε = ε3 + εph, where ε3 is
given in Eq. (39).
As discussed above, since one can set ε3 < 10
−2ε (when
the key length is much larger than 37 bits), the failure
probabilities for basis sift, error verification, and privacy
amplification are relatively small, and the failure proba-
bility for random sampling is the major contribution to
the total failure probability.
Observation. The main effect of the finite key analysis
for the QKD post-processing stems from the phase error
rate estimation. Inefficiencies due to authentication, er-
ror verification, and privacy amplification are relatively
insignificant.
XII. SIMULATIONS
Now let us consider an example of the post-processing
in the simple case of symmetric errors in the two bases.
Suppose N = 1010, η = 10−3, (then n = Nη = 107),
ebx = ebz = 4% and ε = 10
−7. It is not hard to see that
the final key length is much larger than 37 bits. Thus,
the simplified optimization is used.
First, the secure-key cost k3 = 543 bit, according to
Eq. (42).
Second, given n = 107, ebx = ebz = 4% and ε = 10
−7,
we optimize the parameters: θx, θz and qx. Through a
numerical program, we get θx = 1.07%, θz = 0.84% and
qx = 99.8% (or px = 96.0%). Note that, in this case, the
X and Z bases are interchangeable due to symmetry.
Finally, we can compute the key length and the cor-
responding security parameter using our post-processing
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FIG. 2: Lower bound for the key rate as a function of the raw
key length; parameters used: ebx = ebz = 4% and the error
correction efficiency is 100%. The three curves correspond to
three different values of failure probability ε.
procedure and compare with the key length using asymp-
totic assumptions. The final key length using asymptotic
assumptions is
Kasymp = n[1− h2(ebx)− h2(ebz)], (43)
where we used the fact that, asymptotically, the phase
error rate in one basis is the same as the bit error rate
in the other basis and the use of efficient BB84 leads to
always matching basis between Alice and Bob. The key
length with asymptotic analysis is 5.15 Mb, and the one
with the post-processing procedure is 4.41 Mb and its
failure probability is ε = 1.0073× 10−7 (roughly 1 + 2−7
times the predefined value of 10−7). Furthermore, we can
get the trace-distance security parameter using Lemma 1
to conclude that this 4.41 Mb key is composable and is
(4.4884× 10−4) secure in accordance with security Def-
inition 1. Here, for illustrative purposes, the key length
using the post-processing procedure is calculated with
the assumption that nx = np
2
x and nz = n(1− px)2.
In the simulation, we assume the error correction effi-
ciency is 100% (Shannon limit). Thus, the difference be-
tween the “asymptotic-key” length and the “finite-key”
length, 0.74Mb, comes from the finite statistical analysis.
The cost (and the security parameter) due to the finite
key analysis mainly comes from the phase error rate esti-
mation. Note that all the remaining cost is only k3 = 543
bit and ε3 = 7.3× 10−10. This point can be clearly seen
by comparing Eqs. (21) and (39) in the case of large n.
The exponent coefficient in Eq. (21) is − θ24(1−ebx)ebx , while
in Eq. (39) it is − k35n , and also a small change in θ affects
the key rate more than that in k3/n does.
Figure 2 shows the lower bound for the key rate as
a function of the raw key length. Note that since we
use our simplified optimization method, the final security
parameter ε for the failure probability deviates slightly
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error correction efficiency is 100%.
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from the predefined value. Calculations show that this
difference is less than 1% of the predefined values over
the entire plotting range for all three curves.
Figure 3 shows the minimum raw key length needed to
yield a positive key length as a function of the predefined
security parameter ε. In typical applications, a rough se-
curity level may be required for a secret key which is to
be generated by QKD. Thus, this figure gives the min-
imum number of signals needed to be detected in order
to achieve such a security level.
Figure 4 illustrates the effect of the bias ratio on the
final key length. It can be seen that when the optimal
bias ratio is used, the final key length increases by over
50% compared to the case when the bias ratio of 0.5
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FIG. 5: Plot of the optimal bias ratio vs. the raw key length;
parameters used: ebx = ebz = 4%, target failure probability
ε = 10−7, and the error correction efficiency is 100%.
is used. Thus, the bias ratio has a big effect on the key
generation performance. Figure 5 shows the optimal bias
ratio versus the raw key length. The optimal bias ratio
leads to the largest final key length. It can be seen that
as the raw key length approaches infinity, the optimal
bias ratio tends to one. This makes sense since in the
asymptotic case, it is more efficient for Alice and Bob to
use one basis with a high probability for key generation
in order to avoid wasteful basis mismatch, and to use the
other basis only for phase error estimation; this is the
idea of the efficient BB84 protocol [41]. The optimal bias
ratio drops to 0.5 as the raw key length approaches the
minimal for positive key generation.
XIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we propose a complete post-processing
procedure for transforming measurement outcomes in a
QKD experiment to a final secret key, which we quantify
with a security parameter, namely the failure probability
of the post-processing procedure. This failure probability
is directly connected to the composability security defini-
tion (cf. Lemma 1). Our post-processing procedure con-
tains many elements including authentication, the choice
of the basis bias ratio, error correction and verification,
phase error rate estimation, and privacy amplification.
Our procedure results from integrating all these elements
with ideas from security proofs. Since the underlying se-
curity proofs [8, 9, 46, 47] are secure against the most
general attacks, our post-processing procedure also in-
herits this important property. Based on our analysis,
the main contribution to the finite-size effect comes from
the inefficiency of phase error rate estimation, which is a
consequence of the random sampling argument for infer-
ring unobserved quantities from observed ones. Further
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remarks and future directions are listed as follows:
1. In the privacy amplification step, Alice and Bob
need a common matrix to generate the final se-
cure key. The current way to construct the ma-
trix is by Alice sending a random bit string to Bob,
which requires authenticated classical communica-
tion. An alternative way is by each of them gen-
erating a matrix with a pre-shared secret key. Of
course, the amount of pre-shared secret key bits re-
quired must be small compared to the generated
key length. Also, the failure probability is related
to the amount of pre-shared bits consumed. We
leave this investigation for future research. The
main advantage of the second method is that no
classical communication is needed for the privacy
amplification part. In this case, the error verifi-
cation step can be done either before or after the
privacy amplification.
2. In the security proof, the imperfection of X- and
Z-basis measurements and efficiency mismatch are
not considered. It is interesting to consider the de-
tector efficiency mismatch with the finite key anal-
ysis [70].
3. As noted in Ref. [20], the finite-key analysis for the
decoy-state QKD is a hard problem. In the decoy-
state QKD, the fluctuation comes from not only
statistics but also hardware imperfections. The
question of interest is where the main contribution
of the fluctuation comes from and how to quantify
these fluctuations. Since QKD systems with coher-
ent states are most widely used in experiments, in-
vestigating the finite key effect in decoy-state QKD
is an important step towards a QKD standard.
4. In order to fairly compare our finite-key analysis
to others, such as Scarani and Renner [38] and Cai
and Scarani [40], one has to make sure the post-
processing elements of different post-processing
procedures carry similar capacities. For example,
there are different ways to treat the basis bias ratio,
authentication, and random sampling. Therefore, a
clear objective must be defined first before making
a meaningful comparison. We remark that compar-
ing the performance of various post-processing pro-
cedures as a whole and comparing only the underly-
ing security proofs (which are just one element in a
post-processing procedure) are two different goals.
As we have shown in this paper, the main contri-
bution to the finite-size effect comes from random
sampling in the parameter estimation step. Thus,
it may be more interesting in practice to compare
different random sampling arguments.
5. Our analysis treats the X-basis and Z-basis sepa-
rately, especially when we estimate the phase error
rates using the random sampling argument. On the
other hand, one may mix the measurement data of
different bases before any analysis. Doing so makes
it easy to perform a similar finite-key analysis for
other protocols such as the SARG04 protocol [71].
In this case, we can use the Azuma’s inequality [72]
in place of the random sampling argument to esti-
mate the phase error rate. This is discussed in more
detail in Appendix D.
6. In QKD experiments, error correction is often per-
formed in blocks (say, 1 kbit) and privacy amplifi-
cation is performed on all the blocks together. In
some error correction scheme, the failure probabil-
ity for small blocks is not negligible. That is, af-
ter the error correction, some blocks may still have
errors, discarding these blocks may have security
implication and thus care is required [73]. It is an
interesting future topic to give a strict security ar-
gument on this issue.
7. Although our analysis uses particular procedures
for the steps (e.g., authentication, error correction),
our analysis is generic in the sense that each specific
procedure may be substituted by another with the
same functionality. The new secret-key cost and
failure probability will then be used in the analysis
of the generation rate and failure probability of the
final key.
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APPENDIX A: PROOF OF EQ. (4)
First, given that 〈0⊗mX |ρA|0⊗mX 〉 = α, the purification
|ΨAE〉 of ρA is of the general form
|ΨAE〉 =
√
α
∣∣0⊗mX 〉A|0〉E +
√
1− α
∣∣Ψ⊥〉
AE
(A1)
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where
∣∣Ψ⊥〉
AE
has unit norm and A〈0⊗mX
∣∣Ψ⊥〉
AE
= 0.
Thus, the fidelity in question is
F
(
ρAE ,
∣∣0⊗mX 〉A〈0⊗mX
∣∣⊗ ρE)
=Tr
√
|ΨAE〉〈ΨAE|
[∣∣0⊗mX 〉A〈0⊗mX
∣∣⊗ ρE] |ΨAE〉〈ΨAE|
=Tr
√
|ΨAE〉 [α〈0|ρE |0〉] 〈ΨAE|
=
√
α〈0|ρE |0〉 (A2)
where ρAE = |ΨAE〉〈ΨAE | = ρ1/2AE . Since ρE = TrA(ρAE)
and
〈0|ρE |0〉 =
∑
i
|〈ΨAE | [|i〉A|0〉E ] |2 (A3)
where the summation is over all vectors of a basis in
system A, by considering a basis having
∣∣0⊗mX 〉A as its
basis state, we get 〈0|ρE |0〉 ≥ α. Substituting this into
Eq. (A2), we get Eq. (4).
APPENDIX B: EVALUATION OF
HYPERGEOMETRIC FUNCTION
In this appendix, we will evaluate the hypergeometric
function
Pθ ≤ Pr{k|m,n,N} =
(
m
k
)(
N−m
n−k
)
(
N
n
) . (B1)
with k = ebxnx, N = nx + nz, n = nx and m = ebx(nx +
nz) + θnz. Here, we relabel the function for simplicity.
Strictly speaking, θ is a discrete variable with a minimum
quantum of 1/nz, which will keep m to be an integer.
In the following discussion, we assume the integers
N > m > k ≥ 1 and N > n > k. The only ex-
ception that could (though highly unlikely) happen in
the realistic case is k = 0. In this case, for a given m,
Pθ(k = 0) < Pθ(k = 1). Now that we only care about
the upper bound of the probability, we can always safely
replace k = 0 with k = 1 in the calculation.
We simplify the hypergeometric function by the Stir-
ling formula [74]
n! =
√
2pin
(n
e
)n
eλn , (B2)
where
1
12n+ 1
< λn <
1
12n
. (B3)
Then, Eq. (B1) can be expressed as
Pθ ≤
(
n
k
)(
N−n
m−k
)
(
N
m
)
=
n!(N − n)!(N −m)!m!
k!(n− k)!(m− k)!(N − n−m+ k)!N !
=
1√
2pi
√
n
√
N − n√N −m√m√
k
√
n− k√m− k√N − n−m+ k√N
· n
n(N − n)N−n(N −m)N−mmm
kk(n− k)n−k(m− k)m−k
· 1
(N − n−m+ k)N−n−m+kNN
· exp(λn + λN−n + λN−m + λm − λk−
λn−k − λm−k − λN−n−m+k − λN ).
(B4)
First, we can prove that
λn+λN−n + λN−m + λm − λk−
λn−k − λm−k − λN−n−m+k − λN < 0
(B5)
with the facts of m > k ≥ 1, n−k > 1 and Eq. (B3). Re-
mark: though the left-hand side of Eq. (B5) is negative,
it is close to 0 in the order of O(1/12k).
Second, we know that 1/
√
x(1 − x) is a decreasing
function for 0 < x < 1/2. Then we can easily see that
√
n
√
N − n√N −m√m√
k
√
n− k√m− k√N − n−m+ k√N
≤
√
N√
n(N − n)
1√
ebx(1− ebx)
=
1√
N
1√
qx(1− qx)ebx(1− ebx)
(B6)
with the facts of ebx = k/n and epz = (m−k)/(N−n) ≥
ebx. Remark: when epz = ebx, the equality holds. From
this point of view, the bound is tight.
Third, the remaining term of the failure probability
can be expressed by
nn(N − n)N−n(N −m)N−mmm
kk(n− k)n−k(m− k)m−k(N − n−m+ k)N−n−m+kNN
= 2nH(
k
n
)+(N−n)H(m−k
N−n
)−NH(m
N
)
≡ 2−Nξx(θ)
(B7)
where we use the definition of the binary entropy function
H(x). The exponent coefficient is given by
ξx(θ) ≡H(ebx + θ − qxθ)− qxH(ebx)
− (1− qx)H(ebx + θ) (B8)
with qx = n/N and (m− k)/(N − n) = ebx + θ. Due to
the concavity of H(x), ξx(θ) is negative for θ > 0 and
0 < qx < 1.
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Therefore, by combining Eqs. (B4), (B5), (B6) and
(B7), the failure probability of Eq. (18) is given by
Pθ <
1√
N
1√
qx(1− qx)ebx(1− ebx)
2−Nξx(θ) (B9)
where ξx(θ) is given by Eq. (B8). Note that ξx(θ) is in-
dependent of key size N given the error rates and bias
ratio. Now we can see that the failure probability de-
creases (actually, slightly faster than) exponentially with
N .
APPENDIX C: PROOF OF EQ. (29)
We prove Eq. (29) by the following claim.
Claim 1.
m−1∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
<
(
n
m
)
(C1)
when m ≤ n/3.
Proof. First notice that
(
n
k−1
)
(
n
k
) = k
n− k + 1 <
1
2
(C2)
is true for all k ≤ n/3. Thus,
m−1∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
≤
m−1∑
k=0
2k−m
(
n
m
)
=
(
n
m
)m−1∑
k=0
2k−m
<
(
n
m
)
(C3)
is true for m ≤ n/3.
APPENDIX D: ESTIMATION OF PHASE ERROR
RATE FOR MIXED-BASIS ANALYSIS
The analysis in the main part of the paper treats each
of the two bases separately when estimating the phase
error rates for them. This is possible in BB84, since the
phase errors in one basis are the bit errors in the other
basis. And in this case, a random sampling argument
suffices to establish some confidence on the unmeasured
phase error rate in one basis from the measured bit error
rate in the other basis. On the other hand, one may mix
all the measurement data in the different bases together
before applying any further analysis. This can be done in
BB84. For other protocols, this mixing actually leads to a
simpler analysis and thus is favorable. Here, we describe
how to estimate the phase error rate for the mixed-basis
case. When the measurements are mixed, protocols can
usually be characterized with a relation between the bit
and phase error probabilities pp = αpb, where α ≥ 1 in
general (e.g., α = 3/2 for SARG04 [75, 76] and α = 5/4
for a three-state protocol [77]). (Note that here the error
probabilities are the combined values of all bases and thus
do not carry a basis designation.) Given such a relation
in probabilities, we want to establish a similar relation
for the error rates and compute the confidence for it.
A useful tool to do this is the Azuma’s inequality [72]
(see also Refs. [75, 76, 77, 78] for the application of it
to security proofs), which relates the sum of conditional
probabilities to the total number of a particular outcome
in many trials. To start, we relate the probability and
the rate for the bit error and the phase error separately
using the Azuma’s inequality as follows:
Pr{|pb − eb| ≥ εAz} ≤ 2 exp(−nε
2
Az
2
) (D1)
Pr{|pp − ep| ≥ εAz} ≤ 2 exp(−nε
2
Az
2
) (D2)
where pb,p and eb,p designate the error probabilities and
the error rates respectively, εAz represents a failure prob-
ability, and n is the number of measurements made. Be-
cause pp = αpb, we multiple these two inequalities to get
the relation between the bit and phase error rates:
Pr{|ep − αeb| ≥ (1 + α)εAz} ≤ 4 exp(−nε2Az). (D3)
For BB84, α = 1 and this bound is worse than the ran-
dom sampling result (cf. Eq. 23) in typical situations.
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